Wireless ad hoc networks have fundamentally altered today's battlefield, with applications ranging from unmanned air vehicles to randomly deployed sensor networks. Security and vulnerabilities in wireless ad hoc networks have been considered at different layers, and many attack strategies have been proposed, including denial of service (DoS) through the intelligent jamming of the most critical packet types of flows in a network. This paper investigates the effectiveness of intelligent jamming in wireless ad hoc networks using the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) and TCP protocols and introduces an intelligent classifier to facilitate the jamming of such networks. Assuming encrypted packet headers and contents, our classifier is based solely on the observable characteristics of size, interarrival timing, and direction and classifies packets with up to 99.4% accuracy in our experiments.
Introduction
Wireless ad hoc networks have fundamentally altered today's battlefield, with applications ranging from unmanned air vehicles to randomly deployed sensor networks. This, in conjunction with the proliferation of standard and nonstandard architectures and algorithms, has led to the development of countless protocols to support those applications. Additionally, the widespread use of encryption and other anti-sensing techniques has made it increasingly more difficult for network researchers to characterize wireless ad hoc networks.
Security and vulnerabilities in wireless ad hoc networks have been considered at different layers, and many attack strategies and counter-measures have been proposed. One of the most common types of attacks considered is denial of service (DoS), where a jammer may completely or partially prevent communication in the network. Although ad hoc networks are particularly prone to DoS from internal attacks, we are interested in DoS from external attackers due to the assumed use of encryption techniques. This paper considers the intelligent sensing and jamming problem in a wireless ad hoc network. In this paper, we interchange the terms jammer and classifier, as they are the components of the same entity. We assume that all traffic is encrypted including the headers, and that a jamming node in the vicinity of the network attempts to classify the traffic (i.e., determine the type of the packets), and disrupt the operation of the network by selectively jamming the packets that would inflict the most damage. Throughout this paper, we will assume a layered sensing architecture [1] , where lower layer (physical and MAC layer) sensors provide the jammer with key information regarding the traffic observed, such as the packet sizes, packet inter-arrival times, and direction.
We define direction as a function of a received packet, and two packets are said to be traveling in the same direction if they were emitted from the same source node. The jamming node can then use these observations, historical data on the traffic, and key characteristics of the known networking protocols to classify the packets, and possibly engage in targeted jamming. Our contributions are two fold. Firstly, we investigate the effectiveness of intelligent jamming of packets in a wireless ad hoc network using the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol [3] through a test scenario in ns-2 [4] , the canonical network simulator. More specifically, we aim to quantify how intelligent a classifier should be to properly facilitate a jammer. Secondly, we develop algorithms for the automatic detection and classification of both DSR and TCP packets in encrypted wireless ad hoc networks. We assume both packet contents and header information are encrypted and thus our characterization of DSR and TCP is based solely on observable packet characteristics of size, inter-arrival timing, and direction. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 describes the motivation for our work, previous research, and our contributions. Section 3 illustrates our network model and related assumptions. In Sect. 4 we detail the impact of packet classification accuracy on the effectiveness of intelligent jamming. We then describe our classifiers for the so-called historical analyzer in Sect. 5 with their respective simulation results in Sect. 6. Finally we summarize our work and explain future directions in Sect. 7.
Motivation, Previous Work, Contributions

A. Motivation
Automatic sensing and classification can, in turn, facilitate jamming of a network through the selection of the most critical packet types and packet flows, providing opportunities to perform stealth denial of service attacks by Copyright c 2009 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers allowing the network to barely operate [1] . Although it is possible to jam packets in a victim network by simply emitting a strong interfering signal, there would be two significant drawbacks. First, such a strong signal could easily deplete the jammer node's energy resources, and second, the victim network could easily detect the signal and take antijamming measures. Alternatively, it has been shown that if a jammer could identify the network protocols and jam only packets that could inflict the most damage, jamming could be significantly more efficient. Additionally, a jammer could adjust the level and frequency of its jamming in order to avoid being detected by the victim network. Through the use of intelligent sensing and jamming, significant jamming gains could be achieved in an enemy network.
Note that in order to realize these gains, the jammer would need to be able to classify the packets. In this paper, we first demonstrate the potential of intelligent jamming in a DSR ad hoc network, and then develop algorithms for historical analysis (classification of observed packets) in such a network in the presence of TCP traffic. It is important to note that we do not address the problem of online classification, which is the classification of the packets in real-time as they are being transmitted, in this paper. The focus of our historical analysis algorithms is rather on providing reliable reference data that could later be used as an input for the online classification algorithms.
DSR was selected as a protocol to be characterized because of its popularity among mobile ad hoc network routing protocols. TCP was selected as the communication protocol due its ubiquity among a majority of existing communication networks. Therefore, we believe that TCP traffic with DSR routing constitutes an important step for our methods, although we plan to expand our work to include other ad hoc routing protocols and traffic types as well.
B. Previous Work
Previous work for the classification of packets in encrypted ad hoc networks has been done for ad hoc networks using the Ad Hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol and TCP [1] .
It has been shown that size plays an important role in identifying packets in encrypted wireless ad hoc networks. The variability of packet sizes in networks allows specific sizes to be correlated with certain packet types. A probabilistic model of size is developed in [1] for various packet types for AODV and uses a probability distribution to characterize packets based on size only.
Additionally, [1] utilizes a historical classifier that analyzes a history of packets for specific sequences based on inter-arrival timing of packets and their respective sizes. The results from their historical classifier are then used to update their size-only classifier.
While both of these classifiers were developed to classify encrypted wireless ad hoc networks using AODV/TCP, to the best of our knowledge, they do not explicitly consider networks utilizing a variable size congestion window for TCP.
There has also been some work on application layer packet classification in wired networks [5] using techniques based on Hidden Markov Models.
C. Contributions
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, we present the first study of intelligent sensing and jamming in an encrypted DSR/TCP ad hoc network and quantify the impact of classification accuracy on the effectiveness of intelligent jamming. Our work also develops a classifier (historical analyzer) for encrypted DSR/TCP wireless ad hoc networks that is capable of handling a fluctuating congestion window with an accompanying dynamic DATA-ACK round trip time estimator to seed the classifier. This is accomplished through a pooling approach in conjunction with the use of direction information in classifying the observed packet sequences, in addition to the use of size and inter-arrival times proposed in [1] .
Network Model
The network described in this section is the network configuration and topology used in simulations throughout this paper.
We consider a layered view of sensing/jamming as in [1] , where each layer provides services to the layer above and makes use of the services from the layer below. We are particularly interested in the network and transport layers, where an external attacker is able to observe packet sizes and inter-arrival times.
We utilize the network simulator ns-2 to run our simulations and use the ns-2 generated traffic traces as input for our classifier algorithms. Our network consists of two mobile ad hoc nodes with DSR as the routing protocol to maintain connectivity. There is a third mobile ad hoc node, denoted as the tap node (or jamming node), which passively listens to the network and collects information related to the packets heard in the air, saving the observed packet information (size, inter-arrival time, and direction) for use by a historical analyzer. All of the nodes are equipped with standard 802.11 wireless devices and use RTS/CTS to establish access to the wireless medium. It is assumed that the tap node is capable of jamming packets in the air before they are delivered at the target. Each traffic flow is one-way, with data packets from SRC and acknowledgements from DST. The simulations in ns-2 use the default TCP Tahoe version. The network topology is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
Because of the layered view of sensing, we are assuming that the MAC layer is capable of distinguishing between MAC layer control packets (i.e. RTS/CTS) and network or transport layer packets, and the MAC layer packets are filtered so that the only packets recorded are network layer and transport layer packets. The details of the actual mechanisms for distinguishing MAC level packets in a completely encrypted wireless network are beyond the scope of this paper. As in [1] , we also assume for simplicity that, we are dealing with one connection at a time in the network. Simultaneous connections create a situation in which the tap node would be observing packets from one connection overlapping with packets from another connection. In the presence of multiple connections, we would first need to demultiplex the traffic flows before applying our classifier.
Intelligent Jamming
Recall that intelligent jamming is the selective jamming of the packets that could inflict the most damage in a network. In this section, we explore the effectiveness of such an intelligent jammer under various packet classification accuracy assumptions. Our goal is to determine how intelligent, or accurate, a classifier must be to maximize the effectiveness of a jammer for our network. We intend to present simulation results for various scenarios, where the jammer utilizes a naïve packet classifier with varying degrees of accuracy. The results will illustrate the effectiveness of the jammer as measured by the delay between packet transmissions and deliveries.
We will be simulating our network model from above where the SRC and DST nodes attempt to communicate and the tap node attempts to jam communications. To better understand the jamming scenario we intend to use, a fundamental understanding of the DSR protocol is required.
When a source node A wishes to transmit a packet to a destination node B and A does not have a route to B, then A will initiate a process known as Route Discovery to find such a route to B. During this process, A will broadcast a Route Request (RREQ) to its neighbors and this request will be forwarded until it reaches the intended destination at B. Node B will then reply with a Route Reply, which contains the full route from the source at A to the destination at B. However, in the event that the request does not reach B or the reply does not reach A, A will timeout, wait a certain back-off period, and then retransmit a RREQ up to 16 total times before giving up and assuming there is no route to B.
Using this knowledge, we intend to jam packets during the Route Discovery process as the source will attempt to establish a single connection to its destination. Note that we are only interested in jamming packets transmitted by SRC and so packets transmitted by DST would be received by SRC. Simulating this scenario in ns-2 involved the addition of a naïve probabilistic packet classifier to the mobile nodes in which packets were either classified correctly or incorrectly based on randomly sampling a probability distribution consistent with the preset classifier accuracy. Packet jamming was then simulated by dropping packets at the MAC layer.
Thus, with a perfectly accurate classifier, we expect that all of the 16 DSR RREQ packets would be jammed and consequently result in connection failure. However, as the accuracy of the classifier decreases, the chance that a DSR RREQ packet is allowed to pass greatly increases. The probability that at least 1 DSR RREQ packet is misclassified (and Route Discovery succeeds) is plotted in Fig. 2 as the dashed line. With a 95% accurate classifier, there is a 60% chance that at least one RREQ out of the 16 will reach the target. Attempting to block a DSR Route Discovery with a 90% accurate classifier proves to be virtually futile, as there is an 81.5% chance that at least one RREQ will reach the target. We note, however, that it is possible to cause significant delays in the network even with relatively low classification accuracy.
We ran simulations for classifier settings ranging from 80.0% accurate to 100.0% accurate, incrementing by 0.5% accuracy. 1000 simulations were run at each interval and the average delay before a connection was established was recorded in seconds. Each simulation exhibited the same traffic pattern to provide control over the experiment, where each simulation was ran for 100 seconds and consisted of an FTP connection starting at time 0.0 seconds and ending at 60.0 seconds. Upon starting the simulation, the source node attempts to establish connectivity with its destination node. Because the simulation and traffic both start at time 0.0, the source has no knowledge of any routes and thus has no route to its destination and must initiate DSR Route Discovery to find such a route. At this time, the tap node attempts to listen for and jam any perceived DSR packet that is being transmitted over the wireless medium from the source to the destination.
The average percentage of overall connections that is allowed to establish a connection is plotted in Fig. 2 for accuracy levels from 80.0 to 100.0 as well as the expected percentage. While the expected values are higher than the actual values, the expected values simply provide an upper bound for our simulation. Figure 3 shows the average connection setup delay versus classifier accuracy. Taking into consideration Figs. 2 and 3 , it can be seen that increased classifier accuracy leads to fewer number of connections and increased delay.
While increasing accuracy beyond 95% results in significant expected jammer performance, actual rate of increase in performance, observed from simulation, is not as significant. Additionally, significant increase in average connection delay is only observed with accuracy levels above 99%. At 95% accuracy, we observed an average connection delay of 36 seconds, no connection 71% of the time, and 80% of the time it took at least 14 DSR packets out of the 16 maximum allowed before a connection was established. Thus, we believe that a starting threshold as motivation for our algorithm accuracy of 95% is reasonable, though we intend to exceed this threshold.
We should note, however, that we are not establishing an absolute threshold for classifier algorithms in general for many reasons. The first reason being that our network model is concerned with two nodes, and that classifier algorithms in a network model consisting of many nodes and hops may operate similarly with lower accuracy or may require higher accuracy. The second reason is that it may be sufficient for a jammer to achieve an average connection delay that correlates with lower classifier accuracy. Thirdly, jammer restrictions may limit a jammer to jamming only a certain number of packets in a given time frame. Firm accuracy thresholds should be appropriately considered for other varying contexts.
Classification Algorithms
In this section we describe the methods of classifying packets in the network based on various observable metrics. Due to the assumed encryption, the only available metrics from the packet characteristics are sizes and inter-arrival times. Additionally, a node may also distinguish packets from different senders/receivers based on information such as signal strength or angle of arrival, even though the addresses in the packets are encrypted. Accordingly, we will also introduce the notion of direction as an input for our classifier algorithms in Sect. 5.3.
A. Size
Recall that Brown [1] developed a probabilistic size- only classifier to classify packets in AODV/TCP networks. The key idea here is that certain packet types tend to be associated with particular packet sizes, even though there may be some additional variations from network to network. These size variations can be modeled as probability distributions with peaks around the most typical values for each packet type. We have extended this approach to classify DSR traffic in DSR/TCP networks. However, the main disadvantage to using the size-only classifier is the severe dependence on initial seed values for the probabilistic model. Brown [1] attempts to work around this problem by implementing a historical timing and sequence analyzer that would in turn update the probability distribution for the size-only classifier. However, this updating mechanism still has partial reliance on size metrics, posing a recursive dependence on the initial size seed values. An alternative solution to this problem is explained with the next classifier model. Table 1 illustrates the typical size values for various packet types. The natural variability of packet sizes among packet types enables the probabilistic model to perform well. However, in the face of certain encryption, specifically block encryption, the variability of packet sizes decreases as sizes typically converge on the nearest block size, reducing performance of the size classifier [1] .
B. Timing
Because the size-only classifier has heavy dependence on the seeded values, [2] suggests that no assumptions of the network conditions should be made and as a result the probability distributions should be initially flat. Consequently, inter-arrival timing between packets would be the only metric to identify sequences, and from these results the seed values of size can be established. The obvious advantage of this classifier is that it allows packets to claim their distinctive peaks in the probability distributions without claiming unnecessary sizes and causing the conflict presented in the previous subsection. The timing-only classifier is typically used only after a sufficient number of packets have been collected in a histogram of packets. On the other hand, though, the disadvantage in this scheme is similar to that of the size classifier as the classifier has heavy dependence on initial seed values for the mean inter-arrival times for the packet sequences. Again, with improper seed values, the perfor-mance of the classifier suffers.
Additionally, neither the approach in [1] nor [2] addresses the possibility of an increasing TCP congestion window, leading to the assumption that they are dealing with a single-packet window. Though [1] addresses the possible presence of intermediate packets as the result of co-mingled connections, intermediate packets in a single-connection environment are the result of a source node sending multiple data packets before receiving an acknowledgement. We propose an initial solution to handle fluctuating TCP congestion window sizes in the next subsection.
C. Timing with Direction and Size Filters
To resolve the issues presented in the previous subsections, we extend the concept presented in [2] of making no assumption of network conditions related to packet sizes and encryption levels. However, rather than relying on timing alone, we also make use of generic packet size characteristics. We use the dataline threshold from [1] in addition to other metrics, termed filters in our classifier. The term dataline simply refers to a size threshold that separates larger packets from smaller packets, or in other words, data packets from control packets. Essentially filters are additional logic to either support or negate possible sequences within the packet stream.
Another additional filter that we use in our classifier is direction compatibility. The use of direction as a filter in the classification of packets is critical when considering traffic streams utilizing a variable size congestion window. Though we defer the details of handling the congestion window until the next subsection, we illustrate the necessity of direction with the following observed sequence of packet sizes in bytes: 66, 66, and 66.
Assume for now that the time differences between the three 66-byte packets exactly match those of the TCP startup sequence while the packet sizes also match particularly well. The scheme in [1] would then classify these packets as the TCP startup sequence. However, consider now that we also take into account the direction of the packets, and observe that all of these consecutive packets actually originated from the same source node -this would contradict the classification of the TCP startup sequence, as each packet in the startup sequence travels in the opposite direction as the previous packet. As it turns out, these three packets are actually three consecutive acknowledgement packets from previously transmitted data packets. Considering sequences alone using the proposed algorithms in [1] would cause the classifier to perform much worse than the accuracy threshold previously determined in this paper.
Furthermore, using the knowledge that an ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) packet is the smallest packet in the network, we can search the histogram of packet sizes for the smallest packet size. Also, provided that there are enough data packets in the histogram and given that each data packet has an acknowledgement, we can search the histogram of the observed packet sizes for the size underneath the dataline that is most used, which would represent the most common acknowledgement packet size.
Once the ARP and ACK sizes have been estimated, we can use this information in leveraging sequence classifications. For example, if we are certain that the ARP size is correct then we know a series of packets cannot be an ARP sequence unless their sizes correspond with the estimated size. Likewise, the same can be done when encountering a packet matching the ACK size estimate. In the case that a network utilizes multiple ACK sizes, extending the algorithm to identify multiple common ACK sizes is straightforward.
1) Handling Fluctuating Congestion Window Sizes
As mentioned, neither [1] , nor [2] explicitly handles varying congestion window sizes. Here, we describe our initial solution to handling a varying congestion window size for a single-connection. The operation of the data packet pool, or more simply the pool, is based on TCP's behavior of sending data packets only after a connection has been established and not closing a connection until all acknowledgements have been received at the source.
The pool is similar to a FIFO data structure with a fixed size limit and some other major differences. Unlike queues, the first element in the pool is pushed out as new elements are inserted. All elements that reside in the pool are also subject to being removed based on the amount of time spent in the pool. Both the pool-size limit and timeout limits are implemented to allow the pool to be self-maintained during classification.
As the classifier identifies data packets, it inserts those packets into the pool (Fig. 4 (a) and Fig. 4 (b) ). Then once the classifier encounters an acknowledgement (based on the perceived size as described above), it consults the pool for the corresponding data packet (Fig. 4 (c) ). The time interval is calculated and then matched with the DATA-ACK sequence (Fig. 4 (d) ).
2) Cross-Protocol Detection
We have developed another initial enhancement to the classifier specific to DSR, which involves cross-protocol sequence detection. Occasionally it is helpful to "reset" the network as [1] describes in order to start with fresh packet streams. If it is the case that the enemy network has been reset to the point where routes need to be re-established and ARP caches have timed out, then a new cross-protocol sequence can be detected that is as follows: DSR RREQ, ARP REQ, ARP REP, and DSR RREP. The impact of the detection and classification of more cross-protocol sequences should be further investigated.
3) Dynamic Mean Delay Calculation
As stated earlier, a major drawback to the size classifier is the potential inaccuracy of the seed mean values. Similarly, a major drawback to the time classifier is the potential inaccuracy of the seed mean delay values. We have developed an initial round trip time (RTT) estimation algorithm based on the pool concept to provide a better seed mean delay value for the DATA-ACK sequence. This enhancement is necessary since we are handling a fluctuating congestion window size, and longer acknowledgement delays are acceptable. Despite this initial algorithm, we are looking into more advanced techniques to calculate a more precise RTT value for DATA-ACK and potentially for other sequences as well.
Numerical Results for Classifying Algorithms
This section details the numerical results for the classification algorithms. Each of the three classifiers was tested against various packet streams using ns-2 generated traffic traces from a number of different simulations. Each of the simulations used our network model assumptions. Recall that our simulations utilize TCP Tahoe and that network traffic is one-way from SRC to DST.
We ran four separate simulations in ns-2 to produce four varying traffic traces that could be used as input to the classifier algorithms. The goal was to produce traffic traces with enough packets to properly measure the performance of our algorithms. The first three simulations consisted of a single FTP connection between the SRC and DST node. Each of these three simulations was run for various lengths of time, ranging in duration between 20 and 40 second transfers, using a TCP congestion window of one. This meant that a data packet could not be sent without receiving its corresponding acknowledgement. The fourth simulation was run, similarly with an FTP connection, with a 20 second transfer, but was allowed to have a varying TCP congestion window. The role of the fourth simulation was to determine how well our algorithm performed when faced with more realistic network conditions. The tap node plays no role in any of the scenarios.
Because we are utilizing data that was generated by our simulations, we know the actual packet types that we will be attempting to classify. Thus, measuring the performance of our algorithms is simply comparing the actual packet type with the guessed packet type emitted by our algorithms. Confusion matrices were constructed to illustrate the performance of our algorithms and are shown in Figs. 5, 6 , and 7.
The following are the results for each algorithm. 
A. Size
Recall that the size classifier developed by [1] utilized a probabilistic model of size. We replicated the classifier to include DSR routing packets and seeded the classifier with the ideal packet mean sizes, acquired from the traces mentioned before. The results from the algorithm are shown in the confusion matrix in Fig. 5 .
Because size is the only metric we are using, we ran the classification algorithm against all four of the simulation traces, for a total of 2563 packets, of which 2523 could be correctly identified, yielding an overall accuracy level of 98.4%. However, as mentioned earlier in this paper, the success of the algorithm depends on the initial seed values provided for the packet means and is unable to identify packets that share identical sizes with other packets.
While the classifier preformed well identifying many packet types, the classifier was unable to classify any TCP-SYN-ACK, TCP-FIN or ARP-REP packets. This can be attributed to the fact that these three packets share identical sizes to the SYN, ACK and ARP-REQ packets, respectively, and thus are never able to be accurately classified, which is another flaw to the size only algorithm.
B. Timing
Similar to the size-only classifier, we extend the work in [1] to analyze timing intervals between packets for DSR networks. However, we intentionally leave out the size matching aspect of the algorithm when searching the history of packets for sequences so that we can use timing only. Recall the purpose of ignoring size initially is to calculate seed mean values for the size algorithm when assuming nothing about the network conditions ahead of time. The timing only algorithm was seeded with interval means and standard deviations that were calculated from the simulations utilizing the restricted TCP congestion window.
From the confusion matrix in Fig. 6 it appears that most data and acknowledgement packets are correctly identified, but that there are also a high number of sporadic outliers. This can be attributed mainly to the fact that there is no metric other than inter-arrival timing to determine sequences in this classifier. For example, any three arbitrary packets could be classified as a TCP startup sequence, when in fact the three packets are actually a data-acknowledgement exchange followed by another data packet.
Of the 1392 total packets that were collected over three simulations, 1367 were correctly identified, yielding an accuracy level of 98.3%. This accuracy rating is deceiving though, as, again, it can be seen from the confusion matrix that many of the control packets are failing to be correctly identified. Furthermore, we would find the timing-only classifier to perform even worse for other network conditions and topologies that exhibit even the slightest differences. Recall that the interval seeds used in this classifier were precalculated from the same simulation traces that the classifier then used during runtime.
Because the motivation for using the timing-only classifier was to provide accurate seeds for the size-only classifier, we can begin to see how the size-only classifier would actually not perform well at all with these mean packet seeds.
C. Timing with Direction and Size Filters
In the previous subsection we observed the flaws in the timing-only classifier. Thus, we developed a similar classifier that utilized additional logic known as filters. These filters provide the capability of either confirming or negating possible sequences based on either direction and/or other dynamically calculated thresholds. Additionally, we implement the concept of a data packet pool to handle fluctuating congestion window sizes. We also implemented an algorithm to analyze the history of packets and calculate an average round trip time to seed the data-acknowledgement interval and standard deviation. The confusion matrix in Fig. 7 shows the results of our timing with filters classifier. Initial seed values, similar to the timing-only classifier, were precalculated from all four ns-2 simulation traces. Of the 2563 total packets, 2468 could be classified while 80 were either ignored or unclassified. The 80 packets that were ignored or unclassified are simply a result of the filters and are a good indication that the algorithm is not forcing infeasible classifications of packets, thus reducing the number of false positives. Note that not classifying some of the packets is acceptable, even desirable when the classification may be unreliable, since the function of the historical analyzer is to provide accurate reference data for the use of online classifiers, rather than classify all observed packets. Accordingly, excluding the unclassified packets, the classifier simulations above represent 99.4% accuracy. Comparing this confusion matrix to the timing-only matrix, we can see that the number of sporadic outliers has been greatly reduced, but still shows a problematic error rate when attempting to identify SYN, SYN-ACK and FIN packets.
Furthermore, our timing with filters classifier is still vulnerable to failure when the interval seeds are inaccurate, but is more robust than the timing-only classifier in that the data-acknowledgement round trip time is calculated dynamically. Simulations that utilize the pool but not the dynamic interval algorithm result in overall classification of merely 51.4%. Note that even this rating is extremely inflated due to the high number of easy to classify data packets and is a clear indication that incorrect seed mean delay values are detrimental to the performance of the classifier.
Additional filters and metrics should be developed and added to the classifier to help refine the distinction between known sequences. Further work is being done to develop such additions.
Conclusion
Automatic sensing and classification of packets is critical for supporting intelligent jamming in wireless ad hoc networks with encrypted traffic. In this paper, we have studied the impact of the classification accuracy on the performance of an intelligent jammer in a DSR/TCP ad hoc network. We found that in order to facilitate such intelligent jamming, we must provide the jammer a classifier that is at least 95% accurate in the classification of encrypted packets. We then developed an offline classifier that utilizes the metrics of size, inter-arrival timing, sequence, and direction in the process of identifying packet types and sequences. While our classi-fier is capable of handling a fluctuating congestion window and does not rely on a seed delay value for the DATA-ACK packet sequence, it still relies on seed delay values for the other sequences.
We are currently extending our work in various directions. We are investigating alternative approaches to the probabilistic modeling of the inter-arrival delays of packet sequences as well as refining the dynamic calculation of the DATA-ACK seed delay value. Furthermore, we are looking into the development and application of other filters to refine our classification process. Our long-term goal is to extend our work to include other ad hoc protocols and traffic types.
